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QUESTIONS OF REFERENCE IN WRITTEN NARRATIVES 
Hans-Heinrich Lieb 
Freie Universität Berlin 
1. Introduction 
/1/ Strether's first question, when he reached the hotel, 
was about his friend; yet on his learning that Waymarsh 
was apparently not to arrive till evening he was not 
wholly disconcerted. 
-This is the beginning of a novel. Suppose this is 
the only thing we know about the text. We also know English, 
have some general knowledge of the world, and have same idea 
as to what a novel is. How will the text be understood? Af-
ter very little deliberation we will cone up with a hypo-
thesis such ass';,''".;' 
/2/ Allowing for the fact that this is to be just a novel, 
the author wants us to believe that 
a. a man Cor a boy) who, according to the autHor, is 
called Strether [ probably by his second name], 
reached a hotel (the author believes that we are fa-
miliar with the man and the hotel); 
b. immediately after reaching the hotel the man asked 
a question of somebody [perhaps the receptionist]; 
c. the question was about a friend of the man (and the 
author believes that we know whom he as in mind); 
d. the man learned from somebody [ probably from the , 
person of whom he asked the question, and through an 
answer to his question]. that another man Cor boy), 
called Waymarsh, was apparently [ as seemed likely to 
Strether on the basis of what he learned] not to 
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arrive till evening [till the evening of the day of 
Strether's own arrival] (the author again believes 
that we are familiar with the person called Waymarsh 
[ who very likely is to be the same person as 
Strether's friend]); 
e. the man called Strether was not wholly disconcerted 
by the fact that the man called Waymarsh [ his friend] 
was apparently not to arrive till evening. 
Understanding the text along these lines will be almost 
instantaneous with an experienced reader even if he starts 
reading The Ambassadors by Henry James for the first time in 
his life. Ease of understanding is deceptive, though, when 
we try to establish how understanding is achieved. 
In the present paper I will be concerned with one parti-
cular aspect of this problem: the correct understanding of 
referential expressions in /1/, generally, of referential 
expressions in written narratives. The qualification 
"written" is used as a mark of caution; '"'I am analysing an 
example from a printed text and wish to leave it undecided 
to what extent my results carry over to arbitrary narratives. 
Questions of reference have been a standard topic in 
text linguistics ever since its inception, as any introduc-
tory text to the field will show. At the same time refer-
ence has proved one of the most recalcitrant problems in 
generative grammar both from a syntactic and a semantic 
point of view; recent developments such as "trace theory' 
seem to be partly motivated by the continuing struggle with 
'anaphora * and 'coreference'. 
In this paper I cannot even begin to review the exten-
sive literature on questions of reference in linguistics, 
the theory of literature, the philosophy of language, expe-
rimental psychology, and artificial intelligence research. 
Even so it should be safe to claim that the understanding 
of reference in real life situations, including the inter-
pretation of literary texts, remains ill-understood. Using 
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the beginning of The Ambassadors as a sample text, I will 
study some of the general considerations that a reader may 
have to apply for correctly understanding referential ex- • 
pressions in a written narrative. I will concentrate on two 
problems: reference and fictionality, and reference and the 
narrator. 
Naturally, some theoretical framework is needed. I 
shall here adopt the proposals made in Lieb (1979), (1980a) 
for the semantics of referential expressions and for sen-
tence meanings in general. 
2. Reference, fictionality, and the narrator 
2.1. General approach 
Consider, once again, hypothesis /2/. The initial 
proviso, "allowing for the fact that this is to be just a 
novel", is meant to take care of fictionality: James does 
not really want us to believe that ...; rather, he pre-
tends that he wants us to believe that ... I shall not here 
be concerned with the problem of precisely how "pretends" 
is to be understood (but see fn. 8, below). Nor will I elab-
orate on "wants us to believe". It should be kept in mind, 
though, that all of 72a/ to /2e/ is the content of a read-
er-oriented propositional attitude that the author pre-
tends to have. Only the type of attitude ("want - believe") 
has been indicated. The account of the attitude may cer-
tainly be improved. 
As it stands, hypothesis /2/ does not allow for a nar-
rator different from the author. A narrator (or a series of 
narrators) can be accomodated in such cases by the follow-
ing modification: 
/3/ The author pretends that there is a person who ... and 
who is the author of [ the given text] and who wants us 
to believe that ... 
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The dots after "who" indicate the properties with 
which the author explicitly or implicitly endows the nar-
rator. Note that the modification must follow the fiction-
ality requirement and precede the specification of the basic 
propositional attitude, which is pretended (by the author) 
to be an attitude of the narrator: the author pretends that 
there is a person who ... and who wants us to believe that 
... (where all references to the author in /2/ are replaced 
by references to the narrator). The modification can be 
extended, in an obvious way, to cover a whole series of 
narrators. 
For a more precise account we informally characterize 
a number of auxiliary notions. 
2.2. Auxiliary concepts 
First, consider the word sequence of text /2/ (of the 
text quoted in /1/), i.e. the sequence of English words 
used in the text such that sequential order mirrors left-
-to-right arrangement in /1/: 
/4/ The word sequence of /1/ = Strether's^ firstj question^ 
whenq he^ reached g the-j hotelg was g about^Q his^ 
friend' yet^ his^ learning^g that^ Waymarsh^Q 
was ̂  apparently 2q not^ t0 22 arr7-ue23 ¿"£^24 even^n9 2S 
he2g was21 >¡£¿28 whollydisconcerted^q-
• The word sequence is abstract, a sequence of English 
words.1 The text /1/ - the text quoted in /1/ - also con-
tains a concrete realization, say, the corresponding part 
of the original copy of The Ambassadors as produced by 
Henry James. 
We define a referential expression of a text as any 
part of the word sequence of the text such that reference 
conditions are associated with the part. For instance, 
Strether's^ may be taken as a referential expression of text 
/1/. As part of a reference condition associated with 
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Strether* a ̂  we may assume: 
/5/ There is exactly one x such that the speaker is refer-
ring by Strether*a^ to x. 
Strether'e^ is a referential expression independently 
of whether any associated reference condition is actually 
satisfied with respect to Henry James. Referential expres-
sions in the sense defined can be identified solely on the 
basis of the syntax and the semantics of the text as deter-
mined by 'English grammar'. 
As soon as the speaker is identified with Henry James, 
the ficitionality proviso must also cover the reference 
conditions associated with referential expressions. Thus, 
hypothesis /2/ should be modified to read: 
/6/ Henry James pretends that 
- there is exactly one x such that he is referring by 
Strether* 8 ̂  to x, and that he believes that we are 
familiar with any x to which he is referring by 
Strether's, and ...; 
and [ Henry James pretendsl that he wants us to believe 
that 
- for all x^ and x 2 such that he is referring by 
Strether'e, to x, and by the
7
 hotel8 to x_, x. reached 
The two parts of 76/, which are collapsed in the original 
formulation /2J, are to characterize the two parts of the 
meaning of the text. The first part of the meaning is its 
thematic part; it essentially consists of the reference 
conditions and other conditions associated with the refer-
ential expressions of the text. The'second part of the 
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meaning is its Thematic part; it essentially consists of 
conditions specifiying 'what is said' of anything that 
satisfies the thematic part Ca^ reached x 2' etc.), and 
'how it is to be taken' by the addressee ('wants us to 
believe'). Both parts are subject to the flctionalitv 
proviso.^ 
Inclusion of a narrator would be as in /3/. If a nar-
rator is included, "he" is /6/ must be understood to refer 
back to the narrator not the author throughout. 
What is formulated by /6/ is the content of a hypo-
thesis on the meaning of text /1/. If the hypothesis is 
correct, /6/ also is a formulation of the meaning. We shall 
not discuss the hypothesis any further but concentrate on a 
more restricted question: provided the hypothesis is cor-
rect, what are the meanings that the referential expressions 
of text /1/ have in the text? 
3. Textual meanings of referential expressions 
3.1. Author-independent meanings of referential expres-
sions 
The following expressions are assumed to be the referen-
tial expressions of the text quoted in /1/: 
/ 7 / a. Strether's^ 
b. Strether '-8^ first2 
•c. he ̂  
d. they hotelg 
e. * £ all 
f . his^ friend^ 
g- hisls 
h. his^ learning^^ . 
i . Vaymarsh^g 
j - evening.. 
4 k. ^ 2 4 
tillevening^^ 
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All referential expressions happen to be definite sin-
gular nouns or noun phrases or definite singular pronouns. 
In Lieb (19791 I have proposed a semantic analysis of such 
nouns and noun phrases which, suitably extended to cover 
proper names and pronouns, will here serve as my theoretical 
background. 
Take an expression of the form Definite Article + Sin-
gular Noun, such as the7 hotelg. Such expressions always are 
referential ones in the sense that reference conditions can 
be associated with them. Various meanings of the expressions 
can be distinguished. We may here restrict ourselves to a 
single type, referential-doxastia meanings. Very informally 
these may be characterized as follows. 
/8/ For any expression of the form Def Art + Sg N, a refe-
rential-doxastic meaning of the expression is any mean-
ing that imposes the following conditions on the normal 
use of the expression in utterances: 
a. There is exactly one object to which the speaker is 
referring by the expression in the utterance. 
b. Whatever the speaker is referring to by the expres-
sion in the utterance belongs to the 'reference • 
basis' for the head of the expression (the noun) re-
lative to the speaker, the utterance, and some lexi-
cal meaning of the head. 
c. The speaker assumes that any addressee has some know-
ledge of what the speaker is referring to. 
d. The speaker presupposes that whatever he is referring 
to has the properties specified by the lexical mean-
ing of the head. 
Suppose that the expression is the^ hotelg, and a cer-
tain concept, •hotel", is taken as the lexical meaning of 
J- 5 
hotel8, the head of the expression. /8/ then applies as 
follows (EngZ-iih =df the English used by Henry James in 
text (1)): 
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/9/ The referential-doxastic meaning of the_ hotelQ relative 7 o 
to "hotel^* and with respect to word sequence /4/, an 
appropriate syntactic analysis of /4/, and Engliih = the 
relation between utterances and speakers such that: 
a. There is exactly one x to which the speaker is refer-
ring by the^ Hotelg in the utterance. 
b. For all x, if the speaker is referring to x by the? 
hotelg in the utterance, then x is in the reference 
basis for hotelg relative to the speaker, the utter-
ance, and "hotel^". 
c. The speaker assumes that, for all x, if he is refer-
ring to x by thei hotel^ in the utterance, then any 
addressee of the utterance has some knowledge of x. 
d. The speaker presupposes that, for all x, if he is 
referring to x by they hotelg in the utterance, then 
x is in the extension of 'hotel^'.® 
Conditions /9a/ to /9c/ form a reference condition 
that can be associated with the^ hotelg. The meaning is 
called referential because the reference condition requires 
existence of exactly one referent (exactly one object the 
speaker is referring to); cf. (9a). The meaning is called 
doxastic because the referent must satisfy a speaker assump-
tion (.concerning the addressee's familiarity with the re-
ferent); cf. /9c/. Condition /9b/ requires that the referent 
be selected from the reference basis, that is from the 'set 
of relevant objects': at the time of uttering the-j hotelg, 
the speaker is willing to consider certain objects only as to 
whether they are or are not in the extension of "hotel^*. 
Condition /9d/ is a presupposition condition. There may 
be successful reference even if the speaker is mistaken in 
his belief that the referent is in the extension of "hotel^. 
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3.2. Author-restrioted meanings of referential expressions -
(..textual meanings) 
In /9/ we have identified a meaning of the7 hotelg that 
is independent of any specific speaker or utterance. We are, 
however, interested in the meaning that the7 hotelg has in 
the text quoted in /1/, a meaning that depends on Henry Ja-
mes. On our conception of a text (cf. Lieb (1980c), a text 
has an abstract part and a concrete part. In /9/ it is only 
the abstract part of text /1/ that has been taken into ac-
count. The concrete part comprises an appropriate portion of 
the original copy of The Ambassadors, for which we arbitrar-
ily introduce the following name: 
/10/ A* = df the smallest part of the original copy of The 
Ambassadors that contains a realization of word se-
quence /2/. 
We wish to speak of a meaning that the7 hotelg has in text 
/1/ with respect to A*, Henry James, and Enqt-ilh, i.e. the 
the English used by Henry James in text /1/. Such a meaning 
will be taken as an entity of the same type as an author-
-independent meaning, i.e. as a relation u between utter«-
ances V and speakers V W e introduce the following concept: 
"u is a meaning of / in t with respect to V, V^, and S , 
where "f" stands for any part of a word sequence of a text, 
"t" for any text, and "S" for any 'language system' (in 
particular, a system of a language variety, such as a dia-
lect).. The following implication is assumed to hold by defi-
nition: 
y i l / For all u, f, t, V, Vir S, if u is a meaning of f in t 
with respect to V, and S, then u holds between V 
and 
As a first hypothesis we might simply identify the 




a. There Is exactly one u such that u is a meaning of 
the7 hotelg in text /1/ with respect to A*, Henry 
James and Engtiih. 
b. For all u, if u is a meaning of then hotcla in text / o 
/1/ with respect to A*, Henry James, and English, 
then u = the referential-doxastic meaning of the7 
hotel8 relative to 'hotel^' and with respect to ... 
[ cf. /9/] . 
Because of /11/, the relation u that is the only textual 
meaning of the7 hotelg must actually hold between A* and 
Henry James, that is there must be exactly one x such that 
Henry James is referring by they hotelQ in A* to x etc., cf. 
/9a/ to /9d/. 
Hypothesis /12/ could be wrong in a number of ways. Firsts 
they hotelg could have several meanings in the text. Second, 
the textual meanings might be modifications of author-inde-
pendent meanings by which a narrator is taken into account. 
Third, the author-independent meanings might not be referen-
tial-doxastic ones but meanings of other types. Fourth, they 
might be meanings not relative to the concept "h >tel^' but 
relative to some other concept (we could have gotten the word 
meaning wrongI. 
More fundamentally, all meanings have to be modified by 
the fictionality proviso: A meaning of the-j hotelg relative 
to A* and Henry James is not a referential-doxastic meaning 
but is the pretending of a referential-doxastic meaning. In 
other words: 
/13/ a. Henry Hames pretends of A* and himself the relation 
/9/ - pretends that this relation holds between A* 
and himself. 
b. The pretending of relation /9/ = the relation between 
any (utterance) V and (speaker) such that pre-
tends relation /9/ of V and y,. 
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The relation specified in /13b/ replaces relation /9/ as the 
meaning of the7 hotelg in text /1/: 
/14/ Revised, hypothesis. 
a. There is exactly one u such that u is a meaning of 
the7 hotelg in text /1/ with respect to A*, Henry Ja-
mes, and Engllili. [ = /12a/] 
b. For all u, if u is a meaning of iftê  hotelg in text 
/1/ with respect to A*, Henry James, and Eng-f-cift, 
then h = the pretending of the referential-doxastic 
meaning of they hotelg relative to "hotel^" and with 
respect to ... [cf. /9/]. 
The essential features of /14/ are as follows. 
The (only) meaning of they hotelg in the text is obtain-
ed as a function of an author-independent meaning of they 
hoteIqj which itself is a relation between possible utter-
ances and speakers (authors). The function, pretending, ap-
plies to the meaning and replaces it by a new relation be-
tween possible utterances and speakers that -no longer in-
volves actual references. By /11/, this relation holds be-
tween A* and Henry James. 
In the case of a fictitious narrator a second function 
intervenes between pretending and the author-independent 
meaning of they hotelgf assumption /11/ again establishes 
the necessary link to A* and Henry James. The nature of the 
new function can only be determined after the account of the 
narrator that was suggested in /3/ has been made more precise. 
4. Reference involving a narrator 
4.1. The place of the narrator 
For the Ambassadors a first-person narrator must indeed 
be assumed. This 'I-narrator' must be a person satisfying 
the following requirements: Text /1/ - as part of The Am-
bassadors - i s a text by the person; A* is the form of a 
realization of text /1/ by the person.7 The author of any 
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text may preten<?»or claim that a narrator is or is not iden-
tical with the author and has a number of other properties; 
in the case of a first-person narrator, identity is claimed 
or pretended. For dealing with the narrator of the Ambassa-
dor e. we introduce a relation defined as follows: 
/15/ a = df the relation between any V^ and V 2 such that 
Vy = V2 and . . . ..,. 
where ...V^V^... is a formula whose free variables are at 
least "V2" and at most "l^" and "V2" and that formulates for 
V2 the assumptions made by Henry James concerning a narrator 
of the Ambassadors. We may then suggest that hypothesis /6/ 
on the meaning of text /1/ be replaced as follows: 
/16/ Henry James pretends of A* and himself the relation de-
fined for any V and as follows. 
There is a V2 such that: u holds between V^ and V2 
(i.e. V^ = V2 and ...V^y2...), and text /1/ is a text 
by V2, and V is the form of a realization of text /1/ 
by V a n d 
- there is exactly one x such that V2 is referring by 
Strether's. in V to x, and ...; 
The new hypothesis applies the general idea formulated 
in /3/ for taking a narrator into account: "The author pre-
tends that there is a person who ... and who is the author 
of the'given text and who wants us to believe that ...". 
Still, hypothesis /16/ has an important flaw: the reference 
conditions for Strether's^ and the other referential expres-
sions should be relativized not just'to some narrator V2 but 
to any narrator V2 independently of the number of persons 
that satisfy the conditions for V2. This is taken into ac-
count by the following modification of /16/: 
/17/ Henry James pretends of A* and himself the relation 
defined for any V and V, as follows: 
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a. There is a V~ such that: a holds between K and 
^ 1 2 
and text /1/ is a text by V2, and V is the form of 
a realization of text /1/ by V2. 
b. For any such V^, 
- there is exactly one x such that V 2 is referring 
by Strether's. in V to x, and ...; 
"There is a V2" in /17a/ may be strengthened to read 
"there is exactly one V2", which yields the case of a single 
narrator. The relation u as defined in /15/ involves identi-
ty; hypothesis /17/ therefore covers the case of a narrator 
fictitiously identical with the author, u may be replaced by 
a relation of non-identity to yield the case of a narrator 
fictitiously different from the author. 
Assuming that /17/ is correct as a hypothesis on the 
meaning of text /1/, what are the meanings of referential 
expressions like the^ hotelg in the text, and how are the 
meanings obtained? 
4.2. Textual meanings of referential expressions that in-
volve a narrator 
The single meaning of the^ hotelg in text J1/ is built 
up in two steps. As before, we start with the ferential-
-doxastic meaning of the-j hotelg relative to 'hotel^* and 
with respect to ... (cf. ./9/). A certain function that re-
mains to be determined applies to this meaning and yields 
the relation a defined as follows: 
/18/ u = df the relation between any V and Vsuch that: 
a. There is a V2 as required in /17a/, i.e. a as de-
fined in /15/ holds between and y2, and text /1/ 
is a text by V2, and V is the form of a realization 
of text /1/ by V2. 
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b. For any such V2< the referential-doxastic meaning 
of they hotelg relative to "hotel^" and with respect 
to ... holds between V and V2. 
To u we apply the function of pretending and obtain 
/19/ a = df the relation between any V and such that V^ 
pretends ii of C and V 
The function that directly applies to the referential-
doxastic meaning of they hotelg is defined as follows ("V", 
"V^", "V2" range over arbitrary events or objects in space-
time, such as speakers and speech objects or events; "u", 
"uĵ " range over relations between entities V and V^; "t" 
stands for any text): • 
/20/ The w-narrator-of-t version of u^ = df the relation 
between any V and such that: 
a. There is a V2 such that u holds between y and V^, 
and t is a text by V2, and V is the form of a reali-
zation of t by V2. 
b. For any such V2, u^ holds between V and V^. 
Having the two functions of narrator version and pre-
tending at our disposal, we identify the meaning of they 
hotelg in text /1/ by the following hypothesis that takes 
the place of the first revised hypothesis /14/: 
/21/ Second revised hypothesis. 
a. There is exactly one u such that u is a meaning of 
they hotelg in text /1/ wiht respect to A*, Henry 
James, and Eng-iZih. [Same as /12a/ and /14a/.] 
b. For all u, if u is a meaning of they hotelg in text 
/1/ with respect to A*, Henry James, and Engt-Lih, 
then u = the pretending of the u-narrator-of-text-
/1/ version of the referential-doxastic meaning of 
they hotel^ relative to "hotel^" and with respect 
to ... [ cf. /9/] . 
By the original hypothesis /12/ the meaning of they 
hotel8 in the text was simply the referential-doxastic 
meaning. By the first revised hypothesis /14/ it was a func-
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tion (pretending) of the meaning. By /21/ it now is a func-
tion (pretending) of a function (narrator version) of the 
referential-doxastic meaning. This mirrors the growing dis-
tance form 'real-life reference' introduced first by fic-
tionality and then by narrator insertion. 
Our account avoids a major mistake in construing 'refe-
rence through a narrator': By setting up the function of 
narrator version as in /20/ and using it as in /21/, it con-
strues 'reference through a narrator' without falling into 
the trap of hypostatizing a fictitious narrator into a real 
person. The only spatio-temporal entities to whose exist-
ence we remain committed are A* and Henry James. 
There are many questions that our account of reference 
and fictionality and reference and the narrator does not yet 
answer, or even fails to raise. For instance, what is an Q 
adequate interpretation of "pretends"? For what texts is it 
g 
correct to assume fictionality in the sense of pretending? 
What is the role of pretending, or analogous propositional 
attitudes, for defining literary geners?10 I will pick out 
just one among the unsettled problems: giving a satisfactory 
analysis of proper names in fiction. In particular, how are 
we to deal with proper names that appear in a novel but seem 
to involve reference to real-world entities such as places 
or persons? After all, this is a case typical of so-called 
historical novels.11 In the remaining part of this paper I 
shall outline my answer to this question. 
5. Dealing with proper names 
5.1. General framework 
There is a vast literature on the semantics of proper 
names, especially in the philosophy of language. I shall 
presuppose familiarity with the main types of analyses pro-
posed in the literature and will not, in the present context, 
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relate my own account to existing proposals. Novel features 
of my approach will be easily recognized, just as partial 
agreement with previous accounts. 
Proper names, more specifically, singular forms of 
proper names, will be treated as a special subcase of defi-
nited singular nouns.-What, then, is an author-independent 
meaning of Strether 's^, in particular, what is a referen-
tial-doxastic meaning? 
For identifying a referential-doxastic meaning of the7 
hotelg we had to assume a certain concept, 'hotel^, as a 
lexical meaning of hotelg. It has been a much debated ques-
tion in the literature whether lexical meanings may or may 
not be assumed for proper names. I will posit such meanings, 
proceeding from the following idea: a lexical meaning of a 
proper name is a concept whose intension consists of the 
property of 'being called by that name'. 
As an example of such a concept consider 
/22/ 'Strether^' = the concept whose intension is the set 
(St), where St = df the property of being an x such 
p that x is called Strether in Engliih, 
EngtZih is a system of a certain variety of English 
p 
(possibly, only an idiolect of Henry James); Strether is a 
word paradigm of that system (having at least two different 
forms, represented by the nominative and the Saxon genitive; 12 
paradigm status is indicated by the P-superscript). The 
notion of concept again is understood as in Lieb (1979). The 
main difference between "Strether^" and a concept such as 
"hotel^' consists in the fact that the intension of the for-
mer is language dependent (involves a property that presup-
poses a system of a certain language variety or an idiolect), 
while the latter is not. The key term in the definiens of 
"St", ".. is called..in..", stands in need of explication 
but will here be left undiscussed. 
Given the concept 'Strether', a referential-doxastic 
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meaning of Strether's^ is obtained in strict analogy to the 
corresponding meaning of the^ hotelcf. /9/: 
/23/ The referential-doxastic meaning of Strether's^ rela-
< tive to 'Strether^ and with respect to word sequence 
/4/, an appropriate syntactic analysis of /4/, and 
English = the relation between utterances md speak-
ers 7 1 such that: 
a. There is exactly one x to which 7^ is referring by 
Strether's^ in 7. 
b. For all x, if is referring by Strether's^ in V 
to x, then x is in the reference basis for 
Strether'e^ relative to 7, 7 a n d "Strether^". 
c. 7^ assumes that, for all x, if is referring by 
Stretner'8^ in 7 to x, then any addressee of 7 has 
some knowledge of x. 
d. 7^ presupposes that, for all x, if 7^ is referring 
by Strether's^ in 7 to x, then x is in the extension 
of "Strether^. 
The meaning of Strether's^ in text /1/ is obtained ex-
actly as before by applying the relevant functions to the 
referential-doxastic meaning. The following hypothesis cor-
responds to the second revised hypothesis for the meaning 
ot.the-j hotels cf. /21/: 
/24/ Hypothesis. 
a. There is exactly one u such that u is a meaning of 
Strether's^ in text /1/ with respect to A*, Henry 
James, and Enqtt&h. 
b. For all u, if u is a meaning of Strether's ^ in text 
/1/ with respect to A*, Henry James, and Engli&h, 
then u = the pretending of the u-narrator-of-text-/l/ 
version of the referential-doxastic meaning of 
Strether's^ relative to 'Strether^ and with respect 
to word sequence /4/, an appropriate syntactic ana-
lysis of /4/, and Engl-L&h. 
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Spelled out in detail the meaning u is 
/25/ the relation between any V and V^ such that V^ pretends 
that . 
a. there is a V2 such that 
(a) ^ = 
((3) ...1/^2 • • (informally: satisfies the condi-
tions specified explicitly or implicitly by Hen-
ry James for a narrator of the Ambassadors); 
Cy) text /1/ is a text by V2; 
(.6) V is the form of a realization of thext /1/ by 
b. for any V i f V2 s a ti sfi e s ( a a) t o (a<J) 1 then V and 
V2 satisfy /23a/ to /23d/, i.e. 
(a) there is exactly one x to which V2 is referring 
by Strether'g^ in V; 
[etc., cf. /23/]. 
By /11/ and /24/ relation /25/ holds between A* and Henry 
James. 
5.2. Discussion 
Hypothesis /24/ is sound only if the referential-
-doxastic meaning of Strether's^ relative to "Streher^" has 
been correctly specified, and this meaning depends on the 
way in which the concept "Strether^ was set up. With res-
pect to this concept we took the rather radical position 
that the only thing necessarily shared by all 'Strethers' is 
the fact that they are called this way. It may be argued, 
however, that we have failed to take account of certain se-
mantic aspects either by the lexical meaning or by the ref-
erential-doxastic meaning of Strether'sFor instance, ac-
cording to the initial hypothesis /2/, .'Strether' was to be 
a man or a boy. 
We may argue for this assumption as follows /¡e i s 
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obviously ' coreferential' with Strether 'e^,13 Assuming a 
normal use of the pronoun, actual reference by a form of p 
he must be to a male human past the earliest infant stage 
or to a male animal such as a dog or, possibly, to some kind 
of a robot, disregarding a few other, even itjore marginal 
possibilities. In a 'realistic* novel pretended reference 
also satisfies these conditions, which is not necessarily 
true of a fairy-tale. Since the pretended referent of 
Strether's^ is to be able to ask questions and robots have 
to be ruled out for a realistic novel in 1903, a man or a 
boy is most likely as the pretended referent of Strether's^. 
It is quite sufficient for this argumentation to assume 
the lexical meaning of Strether's1 to be as in /22/ and the 
referential-doxastic meaning as in /23/. On the other hand 
it certainly is compatible with the argumentation to intro*-
duce the property of being a male human directly into one 
of the meanings of Strether'This may be done in either 
of two ways. 
First, 'Strether^' as a lexical meaning of Strether'a^ 
could be replaced by the following concept: 
/26/ "Strethe^' = the concept whose intension is the set 
{Str}, where Str = df the property of being an x such 
P 
that t is a male human and is called Strether in 
Engl-Li h. 
Or else, we could add a presupposition condition to the 
referential-doxastic meaning of Strether'sthat is, a 
different referential-doxastic meaning would be assumed: 
/27/ presupposes that, for all x, if ^ is referring by 
Strether's1 in V to x, then x is a male human. 
For other proper names femaleness would have to be pre-
supposed, or being a location, or still other properties. 
It would be theoretically awkward to assume different types 
of referential-doxastic meanings for different types of pro-
per names. To avoid this, a function operating on the origi-
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nal referential-doxastic meanings could be assumed that 
assigns to meaning /25/ the relation between utterances V 
and speakers V^ that consists in V and V^ satisfying both 
the referential-doxastic meaning /25/ and the additional pre-
supposition condition /27/. Still, different functions would 
be needed for different types of proper names. 
Neither the first nor the second solution has to be 
chosen if we fall back on the reference basis for an occur-
rence of a proper name (cf. /23b/); conditions such as 
maleness' can possibly be treated as restrictions on the re-
ference basis when the referential-doxastic meaning is re-
stricted to an utterance and a speaker. 
The entire question may seem irrelevant for a name p 
such, as Strether , which is a family name rather than a 
P 
Christian name, but cannot be shunned for names like Ann 
P 
or John . I leave it undecided which solution should even~ 
tually be preferred. 
On our analysis, reference by means of Strether*s^ is 
entirely covered by the fictionality proviso, and rightly 
so. Such an analysis may seem inappropriate in the cases 
that will now be discussed. 
6.- Proper names and the actual world 
Adding the second sentence of The Ambassadors3 we con-
sid6r the following text: 
/28/ Strether s first question, when he reached the hotel, 
was about his friend; yet on his learning that Waymarsh 
was apparently not to arrive till evening he was not 
wholly disconcerted. A telegram from him bespeaking a 
room "only if not noisy, " with the answer paid, was 
produced for the inquirer at the office, so that the 
understanding that they should meet at Chester rather 
then at Liverpool remained to that extent sound, 
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Chester and Liverpool are cities in the actual world. 
On a correct understanding of The Ambassadors it is at 
Chester rather than at Liverpool, both in the actual world, 
'that Waymarsh and Strether had the understanding to meet'. 
It appears, then, that there must be reference to cities in 
the real world by means of the two place names. On the other 
hand, fictitious characters don't meet in such places. 
Put in a nutshell our solution to the problem is as 
follows: Henry James pretends that the narrator believes 
that he is referring to a place that is identical with the 
real Chester (with the real liverpool); we are confronted 
with the fiction of a narrator who identifies a place he is 
referring to with Chester in the actual world. How may this 
be construed formally? 
We begin by introducing the word sequence of /28/ (of 
the text quoted in /28*) as the sequence Strether's.. 
...Chester..Liverpool..sound^2> i n analogy to /4/. 
Discussion will be restricted to Chester 
As a lexical meaning of Chesterwe take a concept bJ 
'Chester^' defined in strict analogy to "Strether^" in /22/. 
The referential-doxastic meaning of Chester^ is determined 
in strict analogy to /23/, which specified the correspond-14 
ing meaning of Strether's 
/29/ The referential-doxastic meaning of Chester^^ relative 
to 'Chester^* and with respect to word sequence /28/, 
' and appropriate syntactic analysis of /28/, and the 
English used by Henry James in text /28/ (assumed to be 
identical with the English used in text /1/, hence, 
with Engli.Ah) = the relation between utterances V and 
speakers V^ such that: 
a. There is exactly one x to which V i s referring by 
Chesterg3 in V. 
b. For all x, if y^ is referring by Chester^ in V to 
x, then x is in the reference basis for Chesterg3 
relative to V, V., and "Chester". 
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c. V1 assumes that, for all x, if is referring by 
Chester ̂  in V to i, then any addressee of V has 
some knowledge of x. 
d. presupposes that, for all x, if t^ is referring 
by Chester,-, in V to x, then x is in the extension 
15 
of Chester^ 
No real-world Chester figures in the referential-doxas-
tic meaning of Chester Such a Chester is brought in by a 
modification of /29/: in addition to what is specified by 
/29/, the speaker V-̂  also believes that whatever he is re-
ferring to is identical with Chester in England. For a prop-
er formulation two additional constants are required in our 
semantic metalanguage: 
/30/ "Chester-in-England", a constant of the same type as 
the variable "x" and interpreted to denote a certain 
city in the actual world, located in England close to 
Liverpool, 
and a functor "application", defined as follows: 
/31/ The application to x of / given u = df the relation 
between any V and such that 
a. u holds between V and V^; 
b. V^ believes that, for all if V^ is referring by 
f in V to xthen x^ = x, 
where "/" stands for any part of a word sequence. In partic-
ular, 
/32/ the application to Chester-in-England of Chesterg3 given 
the referential-doxastic meaning of Chesterrelative 
to 'Chester^' and ... [ cf. /29/] = the relation between 
any V and V^ such that: 
a. V and V1 satisfy /29a/ to /29d/. 
b. V^ believes that, for all x, if V-̂  is referring by 
Chesterg3 in V to x, then x = Chester-in-England. 
The meaning of Chesterin text /28/ is now obtained 
by applying the functions of narrator version and pretending 
- 163 -
(8* = the smallest part of the original copy of The Ambassa-
dors that contains a realization of the word sequence of the 
text quoted in /28/): 
/33/ Hypothesis. 
a. There is exactly one u such that u is a meaning of 
Chesterg^ in text /1/ with respect to 8*, Henry 
James, and EngZ-i6h. 
b. For all u, if it is a meaning of Chester,, in text b J 
/28/ with respect to 8*, Henry James and Engtiih, 
then u = the pretending of the u-narrator-of-text-
-/28/ version of the application to Chester-ln-
-England of Chesterg^ given the referential-doxastic 
meaning of Chesterg^ relative to 'Chester^' and ... 
[cf. /29/1• 
On this hypothesis the textual meaning u of Chester^ 
is a function (pretending) of a function (narrator version) 
of a function (application) of the referential-doxastic 
meaning of Chester. ^. Spelt out in detail the meaning is D J 
/34/ the relation between any V and such that V^ pretends 
that 
a. there is a V2 such that 
(a) 1/L = V2; 
(B) (informally: V^ satisfies the condi-
tions specified explitly or implicitly by Henry 
James for a narrator of The Ambassadors); 
(y) text /28/ is a text by V2; 
(&) V is the form of a realization of text /28/ by 
V 2' 
b. for any V2, if V2 satisfies (aa) to (a6), then 
(a) V and V2 satisfy /29a/ to /29d/; 
(B) V2 believes that, for all x, if V2 is referring 
by Chesterg3 in V to x, then x = Chester-in-
-England. 
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By /11/ and /33/, relation /34/ holds between B* and 
Henry James. This does not imply that Henry James refer to 
Chester in England by Chester63 in 8*. At the same time a 
complex semantic relation to Chester in England is indeed 
established; this relation involves both the reference rela-
tion and the fictionality proviso. 
The meanings that expressions like Chester have in D J 
fictional texts with a fictitious narrator may well be among 
the most complex cases of 'referential meaning' anywhere."1"® 
We have isolated a semantic relation between such expres-
sions and objects in the actual world that involves, but is 
different from, a reference relation. There are other seman-
tic relations of this type, for example, the relation that 
holds in a roman a clef between a name of a character and 
its intended counterpart in the real world, but these can-
not here be discussed any further. 
The present paper has been exploratory. We stayed as 
close to an actual example as possible, gradually disengag-
ing the outlines of a more general picture. Formal rigour 
was used only when it was forced upon us (which was increas-
ingly the case). Hopefully, the results of this paper will 
seem encouraging enough to go on with a precisely formulated 
general theory. 
Notes 
* Sections 1 to 3 of this paper are largely identical with 
a paper read at The International Conference on the 
Structure of Narrative, University of Szeged (Hungary), 
Sept. 11-13, 1980, and at The International Semiotic Sym-
posium "Theoretical Semiotics: Verbal Signs - Visual 
Signs", University of Warsaw (Poland), Sept. 22-24, 1980 
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The present complete version has profited a great deal 
from discussions during the two conferences. I am par-
ticularly indedted to Manfred Bierwisch for extensive 
comments. 
1 A sequence is taken,as a relation ta set of ordered pairs) 
that assigns exactly one object to each of the integers 
l,...,n, for some n. Thus,' the word sequence of /1/ is the 
set of pairs {(1, Strether's , .,., (.30, disconcerted)} , 
abbreviated as above. Note that the abbreviation also 
applies to parts of the sequence, for instance, the^ ho-
telQ = {(.7, the) , (8, hotel)}. 
2 
There are problems with 'the original copy' of The Ambas-
sadors (cf. Stallmann 1960: 381f), which will here be dis-
regarded. 
3 In Lieb (1980a)., "thematic part" and "rhematic part" are 
introduced with respect to sentence meanings. They are 
here applied to the meaning of a text that has a single 
complex sentence, in a very preliminary way. As a refor-
mulation of (.2) , (.6) does not yet provide a final version 
even for the parts of (.2) that are directly represented, 
4 The underlying syntactic-semantic theory of English allows 
only for nouns and noun phrases (including pronouns and 
proper names) as referring expressions. - The when-clause 
in (.1) has been interpreted in the sense of "When he reach-
ed the hotel, Strether's first question ...", i.e. not in 
the sense of "Strether's first question when ..." (cf. the 
comma in front of when) . 
5 Word meanings are taken as concepts in a psychological 
sense, as explained in Lieb (1979: Sec. 21 and defended in 
Lieb (,1980b) . 
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g 
Being a concept, "hotel^ has an intension (a set of pro-
perties , in this case) and an extension: the set of ob-
jects that have all the properties in the intension. 
7 By a realization of a text we understand an n-tuple con-
sisting of a speech, object or event, a 'meaning' of the 
object or event, and possibly certain other entities; the 
speech object or event is the form of the realization; 
cf. Lieb (1980c) 
g 
I would suggest an interpretation along the following 
lines. In pretending u of y and V^, V^ believes that u 
does not hold between V and Vand does not want that 
any addressee should believe it does; at the same time 
V^ wants that no addressee of V should act on the assump-
tion that u does not hold between V and (pretending 
implies a wish for the suspension of disbelief). 
9 
For example, a text in which a myth is told by somebody 
who believes in it is not a fictional text if pretending 
is explicated as above, fn. 8. I suggest that this case 
may be covered by assuming a propositional attitude of 
the author that is different from but analogous to pre- . 
tending. There may well be a number of different proposi-
tional attitudes each of which may take the place of pre-
tending. 
I suggest that propositional attitudes as criteria of 
classification cut right across literary genres: 'fiction', 
if meant to cover all ficitional texts, should not be set 
up as a genre. 
The question was brought up repeatedly in the discussions 
following the Szeged and Warsaw presentations of the 
shorter version of this paper. 
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12 In view of well-known examples such as the king of 
England'a eon it may be more adequate to analyse 
Strether's into Strether^ e 2 and exclude all Saxon geni~ 
tives as forma of nouns; this is immaterial though to 
our present discussion. 
13 
Coreference is one of the problems that are not discussed 
in this paper. 
14 
Note that discussion in Sec. 5.2 carries oyer in its 
entirety to the lexical and referential-doxastic meanings 
of Chesterg^. 
^ According to my atlas of the world, there are several x 
in the extension of "Chester^", one in England and four 
in the United States. 
Even in a novel proper names may occur outside the fic-
tionality proviso (the pretending operator) ; for in--
stance> documentary material may be included without 
really being 'worked into' the novel. As a rule, though, 
it should be the analysis in Sees 5 and 6 that applies. 
References 
James, H. 1960 [ 1903] : The Ambassadors, edited, and with an 
afterword, by R. W. Stallmann, New York: The 
New American Library. (Signet Classics). 
Lieb, H. 1979: "Principles of semantics", in; F, W. Heny, 
H. Schnelle (eds), Syntax and semantics 3 vol. 
lOi Selections from the Third Groningen Round 
Table, New York etc.: Academic Press, 353-378, 
- 168 -
Lieb, H. 1980a: "Syntactic meanings", in: J. R. Searle, F. 
Kiefer, M. Bierwisch (eds), Speech act theory 
and pragmatics, Dordrecht etc.: Reidel, 121-153. 
(Synthese Language Library, 10.) 
Lieb, H. 1980b: "Probleme der Wortbedeutung: Argumente für 
einen psychologischen Bedeutungsbegriff", in: 
LAB (Linguistische Arbeiten und Berichte) Berlin 
(West) 14, 1-67, Berlin: Freie Universität, 
Fachbereich Germanistik. 
Lieb, H. 1980c: "A text: what is it? A neglected question in 
text linguistics", in: J. S. Petőfi (ed), Text 
vs. sentence continued. Basic questions of text 
linguistics, Hamburg: Buske, 134-158. 
Stallmann, R. W. 1960: "Afterword", in: James 1960, 377-382. 
